In voting systems, game theory, switching functions, threshold logic, hypergraphs or coherent structures there is an important problem that consists in determining the weightedness of a voting system by means of trades among voters in sets of coalitions. The fundamental theorem by Taylor and Zwicker [8] establishes the equivalence between weighted voting games and k-trade robust games for each positive integer k. Moreover, they also construct, in [9], a succession of games G k based on magic squares which are (k − 1)-trade robust but not k-trade robust, each one of these games G k has k 2 players.
Introduction
Simple games can be viewed as models of voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo.
This research was supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología programme TIC2002-00190 (AEDRI II) and TIN2005-05446 (ALINEX), and Grant BFM 2003-01314 of the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and the European Regional Development Fund. Definition 1. A simple game G is a pair (N, W) in which N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and W is a collection of subsets of N that satisfies: N ∈ W, ∅ / ∈ W and (monotonicity) S ∈ W and S ⊆ T ⊆ N then T ∈ W.
Any set of voters is called a coalition, and the set N is called the grand coalition. Members of N are called players or voters, and the subsets of N that are in W are called winning coalitions. The intuition here is that a set S is a winning coalition iff the bill or amendment passes when the players in S are precisely the ones who voted for it. A subset of N that is not in W is called a losing coalition. A minimal winning coalition is a winning coalition all of whose proper subsets are losing. Because of monotonicity, any simple game is completely determined by its set of minimal winning coalitions. Before proceeding, we introduce a realworld example (see Taylor [7] for an extensive illustration of real-world examples modeled as simple games).
Example 1. The System to Amend the Canadian Constitution. Since 1982, an amendment to the Canadian Constitution can become law only if it is approved by at least seven of the ten Canadian provinces, subject to the proviso that the approving provinces have, among them, at least half of Canada's population. It was first studied in Kilgour [6] . A census (in percentages) for the Canadian provinces was: Prince Edward Island (1%), Newfoundland (3%), New Brunswick (3%), Nova Scotia (4%), Manitoba (5%), Saskatchewan (5%), Alberta (7%), British Columbia (9%), Quebec (29%) and Ontario (34%).
For example observe that coalitions (from now on we make use of abridgements to denote the province) S 1 = {P EI, New, Man, Sas, Alb, BC, Que} and S 2 = {NB, NS, Man, Sas, Alb, BC, Ont} are minimal winning coalitions because they both have exactly 7 provinces and their total population surpasses the 50%. Instead, coalitions T 1 = {Man, Sas, Alb, BC, Que, Ont} and T 2 = {P EI, N ew, N B, N S, M an, Sas, Alb, BC} are both losing because T 1 does not have 7 members and T 2 does not reach the 50% of the total Canada's population.
Preliminaries

Weighted Simple Games
Of fundamental importance to simple games are the subclasses of weighted simple games and complete simple games. = (N, W) is said to be weighted if there exists a "weight function" w : N → R and a real number "quota" q ∈ R such that a coalition S is winning precisely when the sum of the weights of the players in S meets or exceeds the quota.
Definition 2. A simple game G
The associated weight vector is (w 1 , . . . , w n ). Any specific example of such a weight function w : N → R and quota q as in Definition 2 are said to realize G as a weighted game. A particular realization of a weighted simple game is denoted as [q; w 1 , . . . , w n ].
